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1. Introduction
In his account of  Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus talks about the 
disturbance (ταραχή) concerning matters of  opinion that afflicts 
his dogmatic rivals and that he himself  was afflicted by before his 
conversion to Pyrrhonism. What is the cause of  such a dis turb­
ance? That is the question I intend to answer in this paper. More 
precisely, my purpose is to identify the distinct sources of  doxastic 
disturbance that can be found in Sextus’ account of  Pyrrhonism, 
and to determine whether and, if  so, how they are related. I will 
begin by briefly presenting Sextus’ description of  the Pyrrhonist’s 
pursuit and attainment of  undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) in matters 
of  opinion. This will provide the textual material for the subse­
quent analyses. I will next examine the distinct causes of  dis turb­
ance regarding such matters that seem to coexist in that description. 
Then, after considering and rejecting two interpretations of  the 
possible relationship between some of  those causes found in the 
literature, I will propose a way in which all of  them can be taken 
to be connected. I will conclude by summarizing the benefits of  
that proposal and by examining whether it entails that there is no 
reason for the Pyrrhonist to suspend judgment across the board.1
© Diego E. Machuca 2019
I am grateful to an anonymous referee and especially to Victor Caston for their 
comments on an earlier version of  this paper.
1 Henceforth, whenever I talk about disturbance or undisturbedness tout court, 
I will be specifically referring to disturbance or undisturbedness in matters of  opin­
ion as opposed to disturbance or undisturbedness in matters that are unavoidable. 
(I will say a little more about this distinction in Section 4.) Also, following Sextus, 
I will employ ‘Pyrrhonist’ and ‘sceptic’ interchangeably, and ‘dogmatist’ to refer to 
anyone who makes assertions about how things really are on the basis of  what they 
regard as objective evidence and sound arguments.
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2. The pursuit and attainment of  undisturbedness
At the beginning of  the Pyrrhonian Outlines (PH), Sextus points 
out that the search for undisturbedness explains why the prospect­
ive sceptic engages in philosophical investigation:
Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μέν ϕαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτήσειν· 
οἱ  γὰρ μεγαλοϕυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν 
ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρὴ μᾶλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἦλθον ἐπὶ 
τὸ ζητεῖν, τί τε ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως 
τούτων ἀταρακτήσοντες. (PH 1. 12)
We say that the causal principle of  the sceptical [way]2 is the hope of  
becoming undisturbed. For men of  talent, disturbed by the variation in 
things and being in aporia as to which of  them they should rather assent 
to,3 came to investigate what is true in things and what is false, so as to 
become undisturbed as a result of  this distinction.4
The prospective sceptic’s search for undisturbedness is again 
referred to at PH 1. 25–6, where Sextus describes the unexpected 
way in which that state of  mind was attained:
ϕαμὲν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ 
ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. ἀρξάμενος γὰρ ϕιλοσοϕεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς 
ϕαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, 
ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαϕωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ 
2 When referring to scepticism, Sextus often employs hē skeptikē agōge ̄ or (as in 
the present passage) simply hē skeptikē, by which he means the sceptical way, way of  
thought, way of  life, or orientation.
3 It sounds no doubt odd to talk about assent to things, but that is what the text 
says. Sextus means that men of  talent were unable to determine which of  the con­
flicting appearances exhibited by things they should assent to (cf. n. 12 below). 
More accurately, they were unable to determine which of  the sentences expressing 
the conflicting appearances they should assent to.
4 The translations of  Sextus’ texts are my own, but I have consulted R. G. Bury 
(trans.), Sextus Empiricus, 4 volumes (Cambridge, Mass., 1933–1949); E. Spinelli 
(trans.), Sesto Empirico: Contro gli etici (Naples, 1995); B.  Mates (trans.), The 
Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of  Pyrrhonism (New York, 1996); R. Bett 
(trans.), Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists [Against the Ethicists] (Oxford, 
1997); P.  Pellegrin (trans.), Sextus Empiricus: Esquisses pyrrhoniennes (Paris, 
1997); and J. Annas and J. Barnes (trans.), Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of  Scepticism, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2000).
For the Greek texts, I have used the standard Teubner edition: H. Mutschmann 
and J. Mau, Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes, in Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. i (Leipzig, 1958) 
for the Pyrrhonian Outlines, and H. Mutschmann, Adversus mathematicos, in Sexti 
Empirici Opera, vol. ii (Leipzig, 1914) for Against the Ethicists.
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δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεν· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἡ ἐν τοῖς 
δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία.
We say up to now that the sceptic’s aim is undisturbedness in matters of  
opinion and moderation of  affection in things unavoidable. For having 
begun to philosophize with the aim of  deciding among the appearances 
and apprehending which are true and which false, so as to become undis­
turbed, he encountered an equipollent disagreement; being unable to 
decide it, he suspended judgment. And while he was suspending judg­
ment, undisturbedness in matters of  opinion closely followed him by 
chance.
According to this passage, not only is undisturbedness an aim 
sought by the prospective Pyrrhonist, but it is also a state of  mind 
desired by the full­blown Pyrrhonist, since it is presented as part 
of  the twofold aim of  scepticism. To the Pyrrhonist’s surprise, he 
achieved undisturbedness after having adopted the doxastic atti­
tude of  suspension of  judgment (ἐποχή) and not because he was 
able to decide the conflict of  appearances. At PH 1. 29, we find the 
same contrast between the way in which undisturbedness was 
 initially expected to be attained and the way in which it finally 
 happened to be attained:
καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἤλπιζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν 
ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν ϕαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρῖναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι 
τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἡ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς 
σκιὰ σώματι.
So, too, the sceptics hoped to acquire undisturbedness by deciding the 
variation in the things that appear and that are thought, but being unable 
to do this, they suspended judgment. And while they were suspending 
judgment, undisturbedness closely followed them by chance, as it were, as 
a shadow [closely follows] a body.
Sextus does not limit himself  to reporting the de facto result that, 
by suspending judgment, the Pyrrhonist unexpectedly attained the 
goal of  undisturbedness—which at the beginning of  his philosoph­
ical journey he thought he would reach by the contrary attitude, 
that is, by assenting to the claims he would discover to be true, and 
hence by holding the correct beliefs. In PH 1 and 3, and above all 
in Against the Ethicists (=Adversus mathematicos (M) 11), Sextus 
also explains why the holding of  beliefs about how things object­
ively are prevents one from attaining a state of  peace of  mind, 
offering at the same time an account of  how suspension leads to 
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undisturbedness and happiness.5 It is notable that he conducts his 
exposition specifically with reference to value beliefs. He observes 
that the presence of  the things one believes to be good and of  those 
one believes to be bad produces disturbance. For when a person 
lacks that which he regards as good, he intensely desires to obtain 
it, and he thinks that he is persecuted (ποινηλατεῖσθαι) by things 
naturally bad and restlessly tries to escape from them. He then 
pursues what he considers to be good, but he is troubled if  he 
acquires it, not only because he is irrationally and immoderately 
elated, but also because he is afraid of  losing it.6 For this reason, 
even when he is not directly disturbed by the presence of  those 
things he deems to be bad, he continues to be troubled by the 
dis turb ance resulting from his constant guarding against them 
(Μ 11. 117, 129). Sextus also observes that those who believe that 
things are by nature good or bad are unhappy or can never attain 
happiness.7 The reason is that ‘all unhappiness occurs because of  
some disturbance’ (πᾶσα κακοδαιμονία γίνεται διά τινα ταραχήν, Μ 
11. 112, cf. 141), which in turn comes about because of  the intense 
pursuit of  the things one considers to be good and the intense 
avoidance of  those one considers to be bad (Μ 11. 112–13, 116).
Sextus thinks neither that the sceptic is free from all disturbance 
nor that all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit and avoidance 
of  the things considered to be good and bad, respectively. For 
he points out that the sceptic is disturbed by certain things that 
impose themselves upon him, such as thirst and hunger.8 Yet the 
sceptic is better off with regard to these unpleasant affections 
(pathē)9 than the dogmatist, since he lacks the additional dis turb­
ance induced by the belief  that such affections are by nature bad, 
5 Only in M 11 does Sextus remark that suspension makes it possible to achieve 
happiness (see e.g. M 11. 111, 144, 160).
6 PH 1. 27; 3. 237, 277; M 11. 116–7, 146.
7 Μ 11. 111, 113, 118, 130, 144.
8 PH 1. 29; M 11. 143, 148–50, 156–8; cf. PH 1. 13, 24; Diogenes Laertius [DL] 
9. 108.
9 A pathos is that which happens to someone or something as a result of  being 
affected by an agent in the broad sense of  this term. It refers to the physical and/or 
psychological state or condition in which the affected person or thing is. Even 
though in modern ordinary English ‘affection’ does not have that meaning anymore, 
I choose that term to render pathos for two reasons: not only has ‘affection’ become 
in the specialist literature a technical term to translate pathos, but it also has the 
advantage of  making clear the connection between pathos and its cognate verb 
 paschein (‘to be affected’).
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and it is precisely the absence of  that belief  that makes them mod­
erate and more easily borne.10
3. Sources of  doxastic disturbance
Any attentive reader of  the texts quoted or referred to in the previ­
ous section will probably get the feeling that something odd is 
going on in Sextus’ account of  the cause of  the sceptic’s dis turb­
ance regarding matters of  opinion and of  the way in which he got 
rid of  this disturbance. For although those texts might give the 
prima facie impression that Sextus is talking about a single source 
of  disturbance both in the case of  matters that are unavoidable and 
in the case of  matters of  opinion, in the latter case the texts in fact 
mention apparently distinct and unrelated sources.
First, in some passages we are told that what produced distress 
in the prospective sceptic was the variation or anōmalia he found in 
things. Judging by PH 1. 12, it seems that it is the very existence of  
an anōmalia that was the cause of  disturbance, since it is first said 
that the prospective sceptic was disturbed by the anōmalia in things 
and it is then remarked that he was unable to determine which of  
the conflicting appearances exhibited by things he should assent to. 
However, at PH 1. 12 itself, and also at PH 1. 26 and 29, we are told 
that the prospective sceptic thought that he could become undis­
turbed by resolving the anōmalia, or by deciding among the appear­
ances, or by distinguishing what is true in things and what is false. 
This means that he took disturbance to be caused by the existence 
of  unresolved conflicts of  appearances, that is, by the fact of  being 
in a state of  aporia as to how to settle them. Hence, it is not the 
10 PH 1. 30; 3. 235–6; M 11. 118, 150–5, 161; see also M 11. 128–9, 145, 156–60. 
The texts that have been quoted or summarized might give rise to the objection 
that, despite his professed scepticism, Sextus makes assertions about the means for, 
and the hindrance of, the attainment of  undisturbedness and happiness, as well as 
about the nature and connection of  certain states of  mind. Sextus asserts, the objec­
tion goes, that the holding of  (value) beliefs directly or indirectly brings about dis­
turbance and unhappiness and must, therefore, be considered objectively bad; that 
the core component of  human happiness is undisturbedness, a state of  mind that is 
therefore objectively good or to be pursued; and that there exists a causal link 
between undisturbedness and suspension, which makes the latter a desirable state. 
This is not the place to address this general objection, but I have replied to it in 
D.  Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and ϕιλανθρωπία’ [‘The Pyrrhonist’s 
ἀταραξία’], Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2006), 111–39 at 116–24.
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existence of  a conflict of  appearances per se but the inability thus 
far to resolve it that brings about distress or anxiety.11 Even if  the 
prospective sceptic could resolve the conflicts he has encountered, 
the object would still appear to him in conflicting ways—think of  
the oar that looks straight in the air, but bent in water, or of  the 
tower that appears small and round from a distance, but larger and 
square from close up—but this would not make him feel distress. 
Now, what is striking is that the conflicts of  appearances remain 
unresolved once the prospective sceptic becomes a full­blown 
sceptic—such a lack of  resolution is precisely what makes him sus­
pend his judgment—but nowhere does Sextus explain why the 
unresolved conflicts do not cause disturbance anymore.12
Second, in other passages we are told that what produces dis­
turb ance (and unhappiness) is holding the belief  that something is 
good or bad.13 This is not to be understood exclusively in a moral 
sense, since Sextus also talks more generally about what is to be 
pursued and what is to be avoided. I take this to include anything 
that is deemed to be of  objective value of  any kind, not only moral 
and pragmatic value, but also epistemic value. If  this is correct, 
11 The reason for talking about inability here is that the Pyrrhonist does not know 
what x is because the anōmalia is unresolvable in the sense that he is unable to resolve 
it. Indeed, an anōmalia can be characterized as unresolvable either because it in 
itself  is not susceptible of  resolution or because one is incapable of  finding a way to 
resolve it. The Pyrrhonist suspends his judgment about whether a given anōmalia is 
unresolvable in the first sense, and it strikes him as unresolved because it is unre­
solvable in the second sense. Whereas I have elsewhere favoured the use of  ‘unre­
solvable’ or ‘undecidable’, in the present paper I prefer to employ ‘unresolved’ or 
‘undecided’—but bear in mind that, as just stated, conflicts of  appearances (or dis­
agreements or disputes) appear to the Pyrrhonist to be unresolved or undecided 
owing to his inability thus far to settle them, as PH 1. 26 and 29 make clear. Cf. 
D. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonian Argument from Possible Disagreement’, Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie, 93 (2011), 148–61 at 151 n. 9.
12 Cf. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία’, 115. It may be worth noting that, 
whereas the term anōmalia refers to the conflicting appearances that an object 
exhibits (e.g., x appears to be F in circumstance C1, not­F in C2, both F and not­F 
in C3, and neither F nor not­F in C4), the term diaphōnia (disagreement) refers to 
the conflicting views about what an object is (e.g., some affirm that x is F, some that 
it is not­F, some that it is both F and not­F, some that it is neither F nor not­F). Of  
course, disagreements arise because of  the conflicting ways in which the object 
appears—or, if  one wants to be more cautious, because of  the conflicting ways in 
which one is appeared to. That diaphōnia differs from anōmalia in the suggested 
way seems to be confirmed by PH 1. 26, where we are told that the prospective scep­
tic ‘encountered an equipollent disagreement’ after ‘having begun to philosophize 
with the aim of  deciding among the appearances’.
13 PH 1. 27; 3. 237, 277; M 11. 111–13, 116–18, 130, 144, 146.
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then what produces disturbance is holding any kind of  evaluative 
belief. Thus, whereas in some passages we are told that what pro­
duces distress is the fact that one does not know whether x is good 
or bad because of  the unresolved conflict concerning x, in other 
passages we are told that what produces distress is having the belief 
that x is good or bad.14 Also, in the former case, disturbance is the 
result of  one’s ignorance caused by one’s inability to resolve any 
kind of  conflict of  appearances; in the latter case, it is the result of  
holding the belief  that one of  the conflicting value appearances is 
true. Hence, there is both a difference in the cognitive state involved 
(ignorance versus belief) and a difference in the object of  the cog­
nitive state (all matters versus evaluative matters).
Third, at PH 1. 26 and 29, Sextus tells us that undisturbedness 
followed suspension tout court, which suggests that the suspended 
beliefs were not exclusively evaluative beliefs. This is confirmed 
by the fact that in one of  the passages referred to in the previous 
section and in two others, Sextus says that undisturbedness 
supervenes upon suspension of  judgment about all matters.15 I 
take this to mean that the attainment of  undisturbedness has at 
least so far occurred only when the sceptic has achieved complete 
suspension, i.e. suspension regarding all the issues he has so far 
investigated. Of  course, the sceptic cannot rule out the possibility 
that others will attain undisturbedness by suspending judgment 
only about some issues, but given his past experience, it appears 
to him that undisturbedness will be attained only when complete 
suspension is adopted. Note also that, at PH 1. 18, Sextus tells us 
the following:
ἕνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίου πείσματος ἀποϕαίνεσθαι περί τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
ϕυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ ϕυσιολογοῦμεν, ἕνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον 
ἴσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἁπτόμεθα τῆς ϕυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ 
τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἠθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης ϕιλοσοϕίας ἐπερχόμεθα.
14 In my view, what produces distress in the case of  evaluative matters is the 
belief  that a specific x is objectively good or bad—morally, instrumentally, or 
 epistemically. Hence, the general belief  that some things are good or bad cannot be 
a source of  disturbance. The reason is that it seems that only the first kind of  belief  
has an object that one can either (i) intensely pursue, be excited to have gotten hold 
of, and be afraid of  losing, if  one believes it to be good, or (ii) intensely avoid and be 
tormented to have gotten hold of, if  one believes it to be bad. Thanks to Victor 
Caston for pressing me on this issue.
15 PH 1. 31, 205; M 11. 144; cf. M 11. 160, 168.
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For we do not inquire into natural phenomena in order to make assertions 
with secure confidence about any of  the matters dogmatically treated in 
relation to the inquiry into natural phenomena. But we do touch on this 
inquiry in order to be able to oppose to every argument an equal argument 
and for the sake of  undisturbedness. In this way, too, we approach the 
logical and ethical parts of  so­called philosophy.
This text makes it clear that the sceptic has not attained undistur­
bedness by suspending judgment only about evaluative matters. 
Moreover, Sextus puts on a par all three parts into which post­
Aristotelian philosophy was commonly divided, and hence investi­
gating ethical matters is not more relevant to the pursuit and 
attainment of undisturbedness than investigating logical or  physic al 
matters. As I interpret the passage, the sceptic engages with the 
inquiry into natural phenomena (ϕυσιολογία), as well as with logic 
and ethics, for two reasons. The first is to oppose to every argu­
ment concerning natural phenomena a rival argument that prima 
facie strikes him as equally persuasive, because by doing so in the 
course of  his inquiry, he assesses the epistemic credentials of  the 
rival arguments.16 He cannot rule out that, after the inquiry is for 
the time being completed, one of  the arguments might appear to 
him to be more persuasive than its rival.17 The second reason is 
that, given his past experience, it appears to the sceptic that, if  after 
the inquiry is for the time being completed the rival arguments 
strike him as equipollent and he is therefore forced to suspend 
16 Pace C.  Perin, The Demands of  Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism 
[Demands] (Oxford, 2010), 118 n. 6, nothing said at PH 1. 18 justifies the claim that 
in this passage ‘Sextus denies that the Sceptic is engaged in philosophical investiga­
tion of  the natural world’ or the claim that Sextus remarks that ‘the Sceptic is not 
engaged in philosophy at all’. For Sextus explicitly points out that the sceptic 
engages in the inquiry into natural phenomena, and qua sceptic he cannot carry out 
his inquiry by making assertions (otherwise, he would be a dogmatist), but by pro­
ducing oppositions among arguments so as to evaluate their soundness.
17 It might be objected that the first sentence of  the quoted text makes it clear 
that the sceptic does not leave open the possibility of  eventually arriving at a justi­
fied view as a result of  his examination of  the epistemic standing of  the rival argu­
ments. (Thanks to Victor Caston for raising this objection.) However, I interpret 
the sentence as saying that the sceptic’s aim in engaging with the inquiry into natural 
phenomena is not to make assertions in the manner of  the dogmatists, that is, 
without first pondering the competing views on the issue under inquiry. Note that 
Sextus describes as arrogance, rashness, and self­satisfaction the attitudes of  the 
dogmatists (e.g. PH 1. 20, 90, 177; 3. 235, 280–1) inasmuch as they hold fast to their 
views on p without taking careful account of  rival views on p or even acknowledging 
the existence of  widespread and entrenched disagreement over p.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 03/10/19, SPi
 Sources of  Doxastic Disturbance in Sextus Empiricus 201
judgment, he will preserve his state of  undisturbedness. Although 
the sceptic has the non­doxastic expectation that undisturbedness 
will be maintained by producing oppositions among arguments 
that appear to him to be equally strong, PH 1. 18 presents, in my 
view, the two reasons as independent from each other: if  one of  
them were abandoned, the sceptic would still engage with the 
inquiry into natural phenomena (or logic or ethics) because of  the 
other. Now, even though Sextus never explicitly remarks that  people 
seem to be disturbed on account of  their holding any kind of  belief, 
this follows from what is said in the passages under consideration. 
For if  undisturbedness was attained only after the sceptic sus­
pended judgment across the board, then it appears to him that dis­
turbance is produced not only by valuing things or by believing 
that things have value, but by holding any belief  whatsoever.
It might be argued that the role played by across­the­board sus­
pension in Sextus’ texts is to be explained by the influence of  dif­
ferent varieties of  scepticism. Consider three passages, the first two 
found in Sextus and the third in Diogenes Laertius. At PH 1. 30, 
Sextus remarks that ‘some among the eminent sceptics have added 
to them [i.e. to undisturbedness and moderation of  affection] also 
suspension of  judgment in investigations’ (τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίμων 
σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκαν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχήν). At 
PH 1. 232, when explaining why the sceptic’s and Arcesilaus’ 
stances are almost identical, Sextus tells us that for Arcesilaus ‘the 
aim is suspension of  judgment, which we said is accompanied by 
undisturbedness’ (τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχήν, ᾗ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν 
ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐϕάσκομεν). At DL 9. 107, Diogenes points out that, 
according to Timon and Aenesidemus, the sceptic’s aim ‘is suspen­
sion of  judgment, which undisturbedness follows as a shadow’ 
(τέλος . . . τὴν ἐποχήν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία). Although 
these passages do not explicitly talk about across­the­board sus­
pension, they do refer to suspension in general and not about a 
specific domain of  inquiry. Now, one could think that across­the­
board suspension in fact has nothing to do with undisturbedness: 
suspension about the different matters under investigation is for 
some sceptics an aim in itself, and so it is different from the suspen­
sion about evaluative matters that has made it possible to attain 
undisturbedness. It is however obvious that this explanation does 
not constitute a solution to our problem because the passages 
referred to above explicitly report that undisturbedness has been 
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attained only once the sceptic suspended judgment about all the 
matters he had investigated. Hence, suspension was regarded by 
some sceptics as an aim independently of  its connection with 
undisturbedness, but it is also something that, when induced across 
the board, has so far been accompanied by undisturbedness. Still, 
it is notable that whereas Sextus does offer an explanation of  why 
the holding of  evaluative beliefs causes disturbance, he never does 
so in the case of  the holding of  beliefs in general; to be more pre­
cise, he does not report on the way in which, it appears to him, the 
holding of  any kind of  belief  has hitherto brought about dis turb­
ance in him and others.
It thus seems that Sextus’ account of  Pyrrhonism presents three 
causes of  doxastic disturbance: (i) the existence of  unresolved con­
flicts of  appearances; (ii) the holding of  evaluative beliefs in par­
ticular; and (iii) the holding of  beliefs in general. I will refer to 
these three apparent sources of  doxastic disturbance as Unresolved 
Conflict, Value Belief, and General Belief, respectively. Whereas 
Value Belief  concerns a specific domain, both Unresolved Conflict 
and General Belief  are domain­neutral: while Unresolved Conflict 
refers to any kind of  unsettled conflict of  appearances, General 
Belief  refers to any kind of  belief. I talk about ‘doxastic’ dis turb­
ance because it is a disturbance that is caused either by the holding 
of  beliefs (in general or about value) or by the inability to deter­
mine which of  the conflicting beliefs about a given issue should be 
held. Let me also note that, while the texts present three apparent 
sources of  doxastic disturbance, they present two ways of  remov­
ing such disturbance, namely, suspension of  judgment about evalu­
ative matters and suspension of  judgment about all matters. Now, 
the crucial question is whether Unresolved Conflict, Value Belief, 
and General Belief  are related and, if  so, what their relationship is. 
Answering this question will also help us understand the way in 
which partial or across­the­board suspension can or cannot allow 
us to eradicate the doxastic disturbance apparently caused by those 
three sources.
4. In search of  a connection
The coexistence of  apparently distinct and unrelated sources of  
doxastic disturbance in Sextus’ account of  Pyrrhonism has received 
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some attention in the specialist literature. However, interpreters 
have not (clearly) distinguished between the three sources that 
were identified in the previous section,18 and only two of  them (as 
far as I know) have offered solutions to the exegetical problem that 
the plurality of  sources generates.19 In what follows, I will examine 
those solutions and explain why I find them wanting, before turn­
ing to my own proposal.
Svavar Svavarsson (‘Two Kinds’, 23–9) maintains that Sextus 
works with two distinct notions of  undisturbedness, corresponding 
to two distinct kinds of  anxiety, one epistemic and the other non­
epistemic. Epistemic anxiety is caused by conflicts of  beliefs and 
does not concern a specific subject matter, but is general in scope. 
18 Casey Perin distinguishes between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief, but 
says nothing about General Belief  (see Perin, Demands, ch. 1; and ‘Scepticisme et 
détachement de soi’, in D. Machuca and S. Marchand (eds.), Les raisons du doute: 
études sur le scepticisme antique [Les raisons] (Paris, 2019), 127–52 at 131 n. 9). Filip 
Grgić claims that the two sources of  doxastic disturbance that can be discerned in 
Sextus’ writings are Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief  (see Grgić, ‘Sextus 
Empiricus on the Goal of  Skepticism’ [‘Goal’], Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2006), 141–
60 at 148; ‘Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism’ [‘Investigative’], European 
Journal of  Philosophy, 22 (2012), 653–73 at 658–60). But at one point Grgić also 
distinguishes Value Belief  and General Belief  and wonders what their connection 
might be (‘Goal’, 157–60). Richard Bett and Svavar Svavarsson distinguish between 
Value Belief, on the one hand, and Unresolved Conflict and General Belief, on the 
other, conflating the latter two as though they were the same source of  doxastic 
disturbance (see Bett, Against the Ethicists, 46–7, 131–2; ‘How Ethical Can an 
Ancient Skeptic Be?’, in D.  Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and 
Contemporary Philosophy [Pyrrhonism] (Dordrecht, 2011), 3–17 at 7–9; ‘Le scepti­
cisme antique est­il viable aujourd’hui?’, in Machuca and Marchand, Les raisons, 
153–77 at 156–7; Svavarsson, ‘Two Kinds of  Tranquillity: Sextus Empiricus on 
Ataraxia’ [‘Two Kinds’], in Machuca, Pyrrhonism, 19–31 at 22–9). However, 
Unresolved Conflict and General Belief  are unmistakably different. For, as I tried 
to show in the previous section, whereas in the case of  Unresolved Conflict the 
cause of  disturbance is the ignorance that results from one’s inability to decide 
which of  the conflicting appearances is true, in the case of  General Belief  it is the 
belief that results from one’s coming to decide that one of  the conflicting appearances 
is true.
19 I should note that in ‘The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία’, 115, I limited myself  to dis­
tinguishing between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief; in ‘Ancient Skepticism: 
Pyrrhonism’ [‘Ancient Skepticism’], Philosophy Compass, 6 (2011), 246–58 at 253, 
and in ‘Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality’ [‘Inquiry’], Elenchos, 34 (2013), 201–
28 at 209, I briefly examined the connection between Unresolved Conflict and 
Value Belief; and in ‘Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry’ 
[‘Argumentation’], Apeiron, 52 (2019), 199–221 at 216 n. 17, I explained in passing 
the connection between General Belief  and Value Belief. Hence, it is only in the 
present paper that I distinguish between the three sources of  doxastic disturbance 
and explore in detail the possible connection between all of  them.
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Non­epistemic anxiety, by contrast, is caused by the content of  
evaluative beliefs and hence is not topic­neutral. Svavarsson thinks 
that, by introducing such a topic­dependent undisturbedness, 
Sextus compromises his scepticism, given that this kind of  undis­
turbedness depends on the stipulation that holding positive beliefs 
about value produces anxiety.20 In Svavarsson’s view, Sextus pays 
that price because he wants ‘more than a vague . . . promise of  unex­
pected tranquility attending suspension of  belief’ so as to ‘both 
advertise the benefits of  Pyrrhonism and unmask the allegedly 
inherent anxiety of  dogmatism (although only ethical dogmatism)’ 
(‘Two Kinds’, 29). Thus, Svavarsson’s solution does not consist in 
finding a connection between the two sources of  doxastic dis turb­
ance he identifies so as to reduce their number, but rather in keep­
ing them apart and splitting the notion of  undisturbedness into 
two, each resulting from the eradication of  one of  those sources. 
The problem with this solution is that Sextus never distinguishes, 
either explicitly or implicitly, between two types of  undisturbed­
ness. To be precise, he never explicitly or implicitly distinguishes 
between two types of  undisturbedness in matters of  opinion, since 
he does implicitly distinguish between undisturbedness in all mat­
ters and undisturbedness in matters of  opinion. Indeed, when say­
ing at PH 1. 25 that the sceptic’s aim is undisturbedness in matters 
of  opinion and moderation of  affection in things that are unavoid­
able, he is recognizing that there are disturbances of which the sceptic 
has not been able to get rid. In order to try to solve the interpretive 
problem caused by the coexistence of  three sources of  doxastic dis­
turb ance in the Sextan texts, I think that the most economic way to 
proceed is to look for a connection between them. Before doing so, 
let me consider another solution found in the  literature.
Richard Bett (Against the Ethicists, 131) thinks that the reason 
why suspending judgment across the board leads to undistur­
bedness is that ‘beliefs in logic and physics are frequently not inde­
pendent of  beliefs about ethics; dogmatic philosophy tends to be 
20 Perin (Demands, 13) dubs Sextus’ remarks about Value Belief being a source of  
doxastic disturbance ‘the value argument’, and maintains that it ‘is very much like a 
piece of dogmatism’. Pace Svavarsson and Perin, I think that when Sextus says that 
those who hold the opinion that anything is good or bad by nature are perpetually 
disturbed, he should be understood as arguing dialectically when he is engaging the 
dogmatists in debate, and as reporting the way things appear to him when he is describ­
ing his own past experience (cf. Machuca, ‘Inquiry’, 210; ‘Argumentation’, 216).
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systematic, and anyone who has the former type of  belief  is liable 
to have the latter type as well’. This means that non­evaluative 
beliefs cause doxastic disturbance because they are intimately con­
nected with evaluative beliefs. This proposal is, in my view, on the 
right track insofar as it explains General Belief  by reference to 
Value Belief. However, it faces the problem that, even though there 
may be non­evaluative beliefs that are related to evaluative beliefs, 
it does not seem that all or even most non­evaluative beliefs bear 
some connection with evaluative beliefs. It could be objected that 
at least some of  Sextus’ dogmatic rivals, such as the Stoics, did 
claim there to be a systematic connection between the two types of  
beliefs. In reply, it should be noted that what matters for the pur­
pose of  the present article is Sextus’ own discussion of  the issue, 
and that he himself  does not establish any such connection when 
examining and attacking the dogmatic views in the three fields of  
logic, physics, and ethics.
In my view, any satisfactory solution to the interpretive problem 
posed by the coexistence of  three apparently distinct sources of  
doxastic disturbance in Sextus’ texts should attempt to show that 
there is only one real source and, at the same time, make clear how 
the two apparent sources are connected to the real one. The reason 
for my view is that, when Sextus explains why dogmatism causes 
doxastic disturbance, the explanation is exclusively in terms of  one 
of those sources. My own proposal consists in explaining why Sextus 
says that the Pyrrhonist is disturbed by Unresolved Conflict and by 
General Belief  by linking them to Value Belief; that is, it consists in 
taking Value Belief  to be the real source of  doxastic disturbance.
As regards Unresolved Conflict, one may hypothesize that the 
prospective sceptic was distressed because he believed that the 
existence of  unsettled conflicts of  appearances is something object­
ively bad, the reason being that he took the discovery of  truth to be 
something objectively valuable, for moral, pragmatic, or epistemic 
reasons. Indeed, insofar as he believed that not all conflicting 
appearances can be true and insofar as he wanted to know the truth 
because he took this to be of  objective value, the fact that the con­
flicts remained undecided was a source of  disturbance (cf. Machuca, 
‘Ancient Skepticism’, 253; ‘Inquiry’, 209). This allows us to 
explain why unsettled conflicts of  appearances, despite not having 
disappeared, are not a source of  doxastic disturbance for the full­
blown sceptic as they were for the prospective sceptic.
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Casey Perin has claimed that the reason why the sceptic was dis­
turbed by unresolved conflicts of  appearances is to be found in his 
interest in the discovery of  truth for its own sake: the sceptic has 
the desire to know which appearance is true, but given that he has 
failed to acquire such a knowledge, that desire remains unsatisfied, 
and an unsatisfied desire is a source of  disturbance.21 This inter­
pretation faces the problem that, after the sceptic becomes undis­
turbed, he is still engaged in searching for truth independently of  
whether or not discovering the truth, if  there is any, is a means to 
the attainment of  undisturbedness (PH 1. 1–3, 2. 10).22 There are 
two key differences between the prospective and the full­fledged 
sceptic, though. The first is that, unlike the prospective sceptic, the 
full­fledged sceptic does not keep on investigating with the convic­
tion or the belief  that there certainly is a truth to be found. The 
second difference, which is the relevant one here, is that the full­
fledged sceptic no longer holds the belief  that discovering the truth 
(if  any there is) is objectively valuable. Rather, on account of  such 
factors as his natural capacity for thinking (PH 1. 24) and the influ­
ence of  the cultural and philosophical milieu in which he was raised, 
the full­fledged sceptic happens to have an inquisitive temperament 
that makes him experience the activity of  investigation as pleasant. 
If  the interpretation about the relationship between Unresolved 
Conflict and Value Belief  proposed here is correct, then the sceptic 
has been able to eliminate the distress or anxiety caused by the 
existence of  unresolved conflicts of  appearances by withholding 
the belief  that certain things, such as the discovery of  truth, are 
objectively good or bad, morally, instrumentally, or epi stem ic al ly. 
Sextus himself  explicitly links Unresolved Conflict and Value 
Belief  at PH 1. 26–7:
ἀρξάμενος γὰρ ϕιλοσοϕεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς ϕαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, 
τίνες μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν 
ἰσοσθενῆ διαϕωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεν· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ 
τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι 
καλὸν τῇ ϕύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντός.
21 C. Perin, ‘Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Search for Truth’, Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, 30 (2006), 337–60 at 351; Demands, 24.
22 Cf. Machuca, ‘The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία’, 115. Perin (Demands, 13) also thinks 
that the value argument (see n. 20) is incompatible with the search for truth, and 
hence that Sextus should discard it. I have addressed Perin’s concerns about that 
argument in ‘Inquiry’, 208–10, and in ‘Argumentation’, 216–18.
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For having begun to philosophize with the aim of  deciding among the 
appearances and apprehending which are true and which false, so as to 
become undisturbed, he encountered an equipollent disagreement; being 
unable to decide it, he suspended judgment. And while he was suspending 
judgment, undisturbedness in matters of  opinion closely followed him by 
chance. For the person who holds the opinion that something is good or 
bad by nature is forever disturbed.
As Grgić (‘Goal’, 148 n. 11) notes, the use of  γάρ at the beginning 
of  PH 1. 27 can be taken to indicate that this section offers an 
explanation of  why the prospective sceptic was disturbed by the 
conflict of  appearances. As far as I can see, PH 1. 27 can explain 
what is said at PH 1. 26 only if  the above interpretation of  the rela­
tionship between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief  is on the 
right track.
With regard to General Belief, it could be argued that holding 
beliefs causes perturbation because dogmatists take having true 
beliefs and avoiding false ones to be something objectively valu­
able: once again, approaching the truth about the matters under 
investigation is an aim that is taken to be of  intrinsic and objective 
value (cf. Machuca, ‘Argumentation’, 216 n. 17). Thus, dogmatists 
may regard having true beliefs (or justified beliefs or justified true 
beliefs) as being of  epistemic value, but they may also deem having 
such beliefs as being, in certain cases, of  moral or instrumental 
value. If  this is correct, then the holding of  any kind of  belief  is a 
source of  distress only insofar as one deems having true beliefs to 
be something intrinsically and objectively good, in which case if  
one withholds all evaluative beliefs, one can still hold other kinds 
of  belief  without being disturbed. Even so, it should be empha­
sized that the sceptic qua sceptic holds no beliefs whatsoever 
because the conflicting views on the topics into which he has so far 
inquired have struck him as equipollent: his suspension is inde­
pendent of  whether or not it allows him to become undisturbed. 
The desire to maintain the state of  undisturbedness may function 
as a pragmatic motivation to suspend judgment, but suspension 
regarding either evaluative or non­evaluative matters is not induced 
because of  that desire, but, once again, because of  the apparently 
equal persuasiveness of  the conflicting views whose epistemic 
 credentials the sceptic assesses.23
23 Perin sees an ineliminable tension between the norm of  truth for belief  and the 
norm of utility for belief, both of  which he thinks the sceptic accepts (Demands, 24–5; 
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If, in order to attain undisturbedness, it suffices to suspend judg­
ment about all matters concerning moral, instrumental, or epistemic 
value, why does Sextus say in several passages that suspending 
judgment across the board is what makes it possible to attain that 
state of  mind? In this respect, it is worth quoting a passage referred 
to above:
περὶ μὲν τοῦ μόνον ἀταράχως διεξάγειν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς τὸν 
περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντα ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν καὶ πρότερον, ὅτε περὶ τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ 
τέλους διελεγόμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, ὅτε ἐδείκνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν 
ϕύσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενον. (M 11. 144)
We have already established the fact that only the person who suspends 
judgment about everything conducts himself  without disturbance with 
regard to the things that according to opinion are good or bad, both before, 
when we discussed the sceptical aim, and now, when we showed that it 
is not possible to be happy if  one supposes that anything is good or bad 
by nature.
Here Sextus relates disturbance and unhappiness specifically with 
the holding of  evaluative beliefs, but he also presents across­the­
board suspension as the means to avoid those states: the person 
who is undisturbed regarding evaluative matters is the one who 
suspends judgment about all matters. Perhaps his point is simply 
that the person who suspends judgment about everything is thereby 
the person who suspends judgment about whether anything is 
objectively good or bad, and hence the person who attains and 
maintains the state of  undisturbedness. But this does not explain 
why Sextus says, for example, that the sceptic deals with the 
 physic al and the logical parts of  philosophy for the sake of  undis­
turbedness (PH 1. 18).
Thus, if  one accepts my interpretation of  the connection between 
Value Belief  and General Belief  as sources of  doxastic disturbance, 
one can understand why holding beliefs that are not about the 
objective value of  things causes distress in the non­sceptic: those 
beliefs are supplemented by beliefs concerning the epistemic, 
‘Skepticism, Suspension of  Judgment, and Norms for Belief’, International Journal 
for the Study of  Skepticism, 5 (2015), 107–25 at 108–9, 115–24; ‘Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism and the Agnostic State of  Mind’, in G. A. Bruno and A. C. Rutherford 
(eds.), Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries (New York, 2018), 114–28 
at 121–2, 127 n. 12). Pace Perin, I have elsewhere argued that the sceptic’s epistemic 
and pragmatic goals are compatible: see Machuca, ‘Argumentation’, 217–18.
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pragmatic, or moral value of  acquiring truth and avoiding false­
hood. If  so, however, one should also say that, up to this point, the 
sceptic only had to suspend all his evaluative beliefs in order to 
attain undisturbedness, in which case it might be argued that 
Sextus’ report on his past experience in certain passages (esp. PH 
1. 31, 205; M 11. 144) is inaccurate insofar as he did not realize that 
undisturbedness did not follow across­the­board suspension, but 
only suspension of  judgment about the objective value of  things. 
By contrast, if  one rejects my interpretation of  the connection 
between Value Belief  and General Belief, one has to accept that 
General Belief  causes disturbance in a way that is different from 
the way in which Value Belief  does. The problem is that, as already 
noted, Sextus nowhere provides any hint of  why he thinks that 
General Belief  is a source of  distress. Of  course, as a sceptic he 
may feel no need to look for a tentative explanation and may limit 
himself  to reporting on something that has so far occurred to him 
and others like him. Note that, in that case, he may not have real­
ized the connection between Value Belief  and General Belief, and 
hence that up to this point undisturbedness has accompanied sus­
pension of  judgment about all matters because these matters 
include those concerning value.
If  my interpretation is correct, a related question arises: why 
does Sextus talk about undisturbedness in matters of  opinion tout 
court instead of  undisturbedness in matters of  opinion about value? 
Perhaps for the same reason he did not see the connection between 
General Belief  and Value Belief: just as he did not realize that 
holding non­evaluative beliefs produces disturbance only insofar 
as one also holds the belief  that knowing the truth is of  objective 
value, so too did he not realize that undisturbedness can be attained 
by suspending judgment solely about all evaluative matters. Or 
perhaps Sextus talks about undisturbedness in matters of  opinion 
because, in talking about the sceptic’s aim, the emphasis is on the 
distinction between what the sceptic can and cannot get rid of: he 
can get rid of  opinions or beliefs, but he cannot get rid of  the affec­
tions that are unavoidable inasmuch as they impose themselves on 
him. Note that Sextus remarks that the state of  lack of  disturbance 
or affection specifically concerns matters of  opinion in four pas­
sages: in three places he speaks of  ‘undisturbedness in matters of  
opinion’ (ἡ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξία, PH 1. 25; ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς 
ἀταραξία, PH 1. 26 and 30) and in another he says that the sceptic 
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‘remains unaffected in matters of  opinion’ (ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς 
μένει, PH 3. 235). At PH 1. 25 and 30, he mentions undisturbed­
ness in matters of  opinion together with moderation of  affection in 
matters that are unavoidable (ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθεια). 
At PH 3. 235, he says that the sceptic remains without affection in 
matters of  opinion and that he is moderately affected in matters 
that are unavoidable (ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ). And at 
PH 1. 26 he refers only to undisturbedness in matters of  opinion 
because, as we saw, he is there talking about the kind of  dis turb­
ance he was hoping to remove by engaging in philosophical inquiry, 
and the reason why he specifies the kind of  undisturbedness 
reached by suspending judgment is that at PH 1. 25 he refers also 
to the moderation of  affection in matters that are unavoidable.24
5. Conclusion
If  the interpretation that has been put forth in the present paper is 
on the right track, then Value Belief  is the only and ultimate source 
of  doxastic disturbance. Viewing Value Belief  in this way helps us 
account for the distress caused in the prospective sceptic by the 
existence of  conflicts he was unable to resolve, and provides us 
with an explanation of  why Sextus says that holding any kind of  
belief  is a cause of  distress. It is also the only way to find a plausible 
connection between the three sources of  doxastic disturbance 
that can be identified in his texts, for it does not seem possible to 
explain Value Belief  and General Belief  by reference to Unresolved 
Conflict, nor Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief  by reference to 
General Belief. Indeed, Value Belief  and General Belief  cannot be 
explained in terms of  Unresolved Conflict because, whereas in the 
24 Why is moderation of  affection in matters that are unavoidable not mentioned 
as part of  the causal principle of  scepticism in the story that explains why the pro­
spective sceptic approached philosophy at PH 1. 12, even though it is presented as 
part of  his twofold aim at PH 1. 25? One may assume that the prospective sceptic 
was concerned to eradicate the kind of  disturbance that seemed to be within his 
power, and that, when he eventually suspended judgment, he discovered not only 
that he was no longer affected by doxastic disturbance, but also that physical and 
emotional disturbances were mitigated. One may also assume that Sextus adds 
moderation of  affection in matters that are unavoidable as part of  the sceptical aim 
to show that sceptics are modest and down­to­earth inasmuch as they do not pur­
port to have attained complete undisturbedness.
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former two cases disturbance is supposed to be caused by the 
 holding of  a belief  (either about an evaluative matter or about any 
matter), in the latter case it is supposed to be caused by the inabil­
ity to determine which of  the conflicting beliefs about a given mat­
ter is to be held. With regard to General Belief  being taken as the 
only real source of  doxastic disturbance, it could first be thought 
that Unresolved Conflict is said to cause disturbance because the 
inability to settle conflicts of  appearances is accompanied by the 
belief  that there is an objective truth that can be discovered or by 
the belief  that one of  the conflicting appearances must be true, and 
holding any belief  brings about disturbance. However, this does 
not explain why holding either of  those beliefs (or any other non­
evaluative belief) causes distress or anxiety. Secondly, it could be 
thought that Value Belief  is said to be a source of  doxastic dis turb­
ance because holding an evaluative belief  causes that kind of  dis­
turb ance for the simple reason that holding any belief  has such an 
effect. However, this does not explain why Sextus focuses so much 
on Value Belief  instead of  telling us why the holding of  any kind 
of  belief  is a source of  doxastic disturbance. In this regard, the 
interpretation that I have proposed has the advantage of  squaring 
well with the fact that, when Sextus offers a non­committed but 
detailed account of  why dogmatism produces doxastic disturbance, 
the explanation is exclusively in terms of  the holding of  evaluative 
beliefs.25
25 While the present article was undergoing blind review, I found a reference to 
D. Taylor, ‘Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Value Nihilism, and the Good of  Knowledge’, 
Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2014), 317–39. When I read it, I discovered that Taylor too 
proposes to explain Unresolved Conflict and General Belief—which he conflates, as 
do Bett and Svavarsson (see n. 18 above)—by reference to Value Belief. Given this, 
I should note that the interpretation according to which the inability to resolve 
conflicts caused disturbance in the prospective sceptic because he valued knowledge 
had already been proposed in Machuca, ‘Ancient Skepticism’, 253, and ‘Inquiry’, 
209—as is attested by J. W. Wieland, ‘Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?’, Philosophical 
Explorations, 15 (2012), 277–89 at 288 n. 8, and by L.  Castagnoli, ‘Aporia and 
Enquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism’, in G.  Karamanolis and V.  Politis (eds.), The 
Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge, 2018), 205–27 at 219 n. 64. 
However, Taylor does not cite either of  those articles, which accords well with the 
fact that he cites only a small part of  the specialist literature and with the fact that 
the most recent work he refers to is from 2006. It is notable, though, that quite a 
number of the remarks and analyses made in his paper can also be found in the works 
of  other interpreters, such as Grgić’s ‘Goal’ and ‘Investigative’, and Svavarsson’s 
‘Two Kinds’, none of  which Taylor cites.
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Judging from PH 1. 26–7, Sextus recognizes that there is a con­
nection between Unresolved Conflict and Value Belief—given that 
the use of  γάρ to connect the two sections implies that the former 
source of  doxastic disturbance is to be explained by reference to 
the latter—even though he does not specify what that connection 
is. As regards the relationship between General Belief  and Value 
Belief, not only does he not explain what it is, but he does not even 
give a hint that he recognizes that they are connected. Nevertheless, 
as was just pointed out, positing such a relationship is what allows 
us to understand why Sextus could have thought that undisturbed­
ness supervened only once the Pyrrhonist suspended judgment 
about all the matters he had investigated.
It could be argued that, once the Pyrrhonist realizes that holding 
non­evaluative beliefs causes doxastic disturbance only insofar as 
one takes the holding of  true beliefs to be of  objective value, he 
should not bother anymore with suspending non­evaluative beliefs, 
contenting himself  instead with suspending that second­order 
evaluative belief. This line of  thought is correct only if  one focuses 
exclusively on the Pyrrhonist’s practical aim: given his past experi­
ence, he has the non­doxastic expectation that undisturbedness 
will be attained by suspending judgment about evaluative matters 
only, without it being necessary to suspend judgment also about non­
evaluative matters. However, that line of  thought overlooks the fact 
that, insofar as the Pyrrhonist also has an epistemic aim motivated 
by his inquisitive temperament, he will examine both evaluative and 
non­evaluative matters in order to assess the epistemic standing of  
the rival views on those matters; and he will suspend his judgment 
if—and only if—the conflicting assertions, arguments, or doctrines 
under investigation strike him as equipollent. It should be borne in 
mind that Sextan Pyrrhonism is not exhausted by the pursuit and 
attainment of  undisturbedness. Moreover, as I have argued else­
where, neither the pursuit nor the attainment of  undisturbedness 
should be deemed to be essential to Sextus’ Pyrrhonism.26 This is 
not to say, though, that Pyrrhonism as a philosophy has no prac­
tical implications. Rather, my point is that we should not lose sight 
of  the fact that there are central aspects of  Sextan Pyrrhonism that 
are closely intertwined and that are independent of  the pursuit and 
26 ‘The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία’, 124–9; ‘Sextus on Ataraxia Revisited’, Ancient 
Philosophy (forthcoming).
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attainment of  undisturbedness, namely, the systematic exercise of  
the ability to set up oppositions among views on a given issue, the 
continuing engagement in open­minded and truth­directed inquiry, 
the across­the­board suspension of  judgment resulting from the 
equipollence of the opposed views, and the adoption of what appears 
as the Pyrrhonist’s criterion of  action.
CONICET (Argentina)
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